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COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
I. Introduction 
Rev. Proc. 93-271 states that, generally, the Internal 
Revenue Service will not treat the receipt of a partner-
ship profits interest2 in exchange for the provision of 
services, by a person in a partner capacity or in an-
ticipation of being a partner, to or for the benefit of a 
partnership as a taxable event to either the service-
rendering partner or the partnership. Is Sol Diamond 
dead at last? And did he die quietly?3 Not quite! The 
revenue procedure also sets forth three exceptions to 
this grant: 
(1) if the profits interest relates to a substan-
tially certain and predictable stream of income 
from partnership assets, such as income from 
high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net 
lease; 
(2) if within two years of receipt, the partner 
disposes of the profits interest; or 
(3) if the profits interest is a limited partner-
ship interest in a 'publicly traded partnership' 
within the meaning of section 7704(b) . ... 
Rev. Proc. 93-27 does not specify whether non-
realization or nonrecognition applies; rather, it stipu-
lates that "the Internal Revenue Service will not treat 
the receipt of such an interest as a taxable event for the 
partner or the partnership." The appropriate treatment 
of the receipt is non realization if the rationale is either 
(1) that the profits interest has no determinable fair 
market value (or character) in year 1, or the sometimes 
related notion that a mere promise to pay is not income, 
or preferably (2) that receipt of a profits interest subject 
to entrepreneurial risk for partner capacity services 
11993-241.R.B. 1 Oune 9, 1993), electronically reproduced 93 
TNT 123-7. The model for this procedure was suggested by 
Chicago Bar Association. "Chicago Bar Association Says 
Campbell Decision Has Left Too Many Partnerships in the 
Soup," 91 TNT 58-35 (March 14, 1991). 
2"Capital interest" is defined using a present liquidating 
value on date of receipt of profits share. ld. sec. 2.01. A 
"profits interest," usually called a profit share in this article, 
is defined as any "partnership" interest other than a capital 
interest. ld . . 02. The regulations already define "capital inter-
est" in other contexts. Treas. Reg. section 1.704-1(e)(1)(v); cf 
section 1.721-1(B)(1). "Partnership" rules out creditors of the 
partnership having a profits interest. Actually, in the eyes of 
some, creditors would have a "disguised" capital interest, 
but that's another story. See GCM 36702 (April 12, 1976) ("We 
see no reason why the corporate cases and the [debt-equity] 
principles developed therein cannot be applied to partner-
ships."); accord, GCM 38275 (Feb. 7, 1980); GCM 36031 (Oct. 
1,1974); TAM. 8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987). How about the mir-
ror-image genesis of sections 351 and 721? Or the fact that 
corporate debt-equity litigation arose predominantly in the 
context of back door integration (avoidance of taxation at 
corporation and investor level on funds earned by the cor-
poration and winding up in the hands of the investor), which 
partnerships already have access to via the front door? 
3Credit to Schmolka, Commentary, "Taxing Partnership 
Interests Exchanged for Services: Let Diamond/Campbell 
Quietly Die," 47 Tax L. Rev. 287 (1991), and, hence, Hor-
tens tine & Ford, "Receipt of a Partnership Interest for Ser-
vices: A Controversy That Will Not Die," 65 Taxes 880 (1987). 
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constitutes a common law nonrealization admission to 
the partnership. The appropriate treatment is nonrecog-
nition if the rationale is an exchange under section 721 
of property for a partnership (profits) interest.4 The 
Service similarly presented no rationale for either the 
general rule or its inevitable exceptions. Rather, a 
"Background" section recited without commentary the 
following conflicting judicial positions: (1) receipt of a 
partnership profits interest for services is not taxable 
(the Eighth Circuit's Campbell dictum,S since the 
Campbell court came to rest its decision on an inability 
to value the speculative profits share) versus current 
4After having thought this through, I discovered pleasing 
confirmation in GCM 10092, XI-1 C.B. 114 (1932), revoked on 
other grounds, GCM 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58. (The reason and 
import of the revocation are discussed at notes 172-73 and 
accompanying text.) The Service was helped in the 1920s and 
1930s as it formulated its partnership tax rules by the stark 
simplicity of the taxing statute here prior to the 1954 code. (1) 
The partnership reported an information return and did not 
pay federal income tax, (2) a partner reported her share of 
partnership income, and after 1934 (3) a (still) unhelpful 
definition of partner, and (4) a carryover basis provision for 
contributions of property to a partnership by a partner ap-
plied. Thus, Treasury argued in 1933 that "the tax law seems 
to take the same view which is taken by the law generally -
that a partnership is not a separate entity but that it is to be 
regarded as consisting of the various partners doing business 
as individuals .... [T]he partnership is not a legal entity but 
is simply an aggregation of individuals ." Hearings on 
Revenue Revision, 1934, before the House Ways and Means 
Comm., 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1933)(Statement of Dr. 
Magill) ("1934 House Hearings"). 
sCampbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815, 821, 822 (8th Cir. 
1991) (Campbell II) ("The commentators generally agree that 
the nonrecognition principles of section 721 do not apply to 
a service partner because a service partner does not contribute 
property in exchange for his partnership interest. ... We also 
agree ... Probably more relevant to our analysis, however, is 
section 707 of the Internal Revenue Code, which supports 
Campbell's argument [that a service partner who receives a 
profits interest in exchange for services provided to a 
partnership does not realize income upon receipt of such 
interest and therefore no taxable event occurs] ." String cites of 
the undying literature can be found in Cuff, "Campbell v. Com-
missioner: Is There Now 'Little or No Chance' of Taxation of 
'Profits' Interest in a Partnership?" 59 Taxes 643, 644 n.2 (1991); 
Section of Taxation, Los Angeles County Bar Association, 
"Comments on Taxation of the Receipt of a Profits Partnership 
Interest for Services," n.1 (May 4, 1991), electronically reproduced 
91 TNT 130-26 (,,1991 LA Bar Report") (Cuff principal author); 
Hortenstine & Ford, supra note 3 at 880 n .1; updated in Fried-
man, "Partnership Securities," 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 522 at n.4 (1993), 
electronically reproduced 93 TNT 226-166 (Nov. 3, 1993). To these 
lists must be added the useful "Colloquium on Partnership 
Taxation," 47 Tax L. Rev. 247-312 (1991). For a tight, thoughtful 
policy analysis of the little explored treatment of the partner-
ship itself upon admission of a service partner, see Gunn, 
"Partnership Interest for Services: Partnership Gain and Loss?" 
47 Tax Notes 699, 705 (May 7, 1990) ("One of the few general 
principles that seem to have governed the drafting of subchap-
ter K is this: Partners do not recognize gains and losses upon 
dealing with their partnerships unless recognition is needed to 
avoid negative basis or some other departure from fundamen-
tal tax principles."). 
TAX NOTES, March 28, 1994 
taxability under section 83 (the Tax Court in Campbe1l6 
and the district court in St. John7); and (2) most courts 
found the value of such an interest too speculative to 
be taxable (Eighth Circuit in Campbell and the district 
court in St. John), but the Seventh Circuit, in the 
landmark Diamonds decision almost two decades ago, 
implicitly choosing an entity approach to the problem, 
found the value of such a profits interest readily deter-
minable when it was sold three weeks after receipt.9 
Professor Davis in his article "Discretionary Justice -
A Preliminary Inquiry,"10 posits just such a first step in 
rulemaking when the agency is not yet certain about 
the general principle.u Perhaps the IRS's National Of-
fice is more certain than some courts about the prin-
ciples of subchapter K as well as its detail in this con-
text, but a stream can rise no higher than its source,12 
unless dammed. 
6Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1990-236, rev'd, 943 F.2d 
815 (8th Cir. 1991) (Campbell D. 
1St. John v. United States, 1984-1 USTC Para. 9158, 53 
AFTR2d Para. 84-718 (CIi>. Ill., Nov. 16, 1983); noted in 
"Receipt of a Partnership Profits Interest for Services: St. John 
v. United States," 5 Va. Tax Rev. 127 (1985). 
8Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(Diamond II) Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit solely ad-
dressed Cowan, "Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits 
in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case," 27 Tax L. 
Rev. 161 (1972). 492 F.2d at 298. The aggregate argument of 
Lane, "Sol Diamond, The Tax Court Upsets the Service 
Partner," 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 239 (1973), is hard to counter and 
would have supplied an, if not the, "explanation of why this 
[nonrealization] should be so," which the Seventh Circuit 
could not find in the articles it cited. Talk about missed op-
portunities! 
9Rev. Proc. 93-27 did not mention the Tax Court's analysis 
in Campbell I of tax shelter value, which is rather convincing. 
See Smith, "Campbell v. Commissioner: The Eighth Circuit 
Adds Uncertainty to the Tax Treatment Regarding the Receipt 
of a Profits-Only Partnership Interest in Exchange for Ser-
vices," 93 TNT 218-82 at n.88 (Oct. 25, 1993). Upon rereading 
and further reflection, I now see as even more convincing 
Hortenstine & Ford's insight that an open transaction ration-
ale for nontaxation of the receipt of a profits share for services 
is inconsistent with immediate "access to the benefits of 
partner status." 
IODavis," Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary Inquiry," 
103 (LSU Press 1969); see also Mashaw, "Bureaucratic Justice, 
Managing Social Disability Claims," 103-22 (Yale Univ. Press 
1983). 
liThe Service elsewhere has considered simply using 
bright-line tests without committing itself to theories. See, 
e.g., "Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; 
Washington Uncertain of Outcome," 93 TNT 102-10, May 12, 
1993 ("Service Ponders") . 
12United States v. Greenleaf, 546 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(partnership rights against self incrimination in the context 
of IRS subpoena like "a stream can not rise above its source, 
the partner's individual rights") - Unde nil magis generator 
ipse. Study of selected General Counsel Memoranda of the 
1970s and 1980s (which frequently rose to the level of quality 
law review articles of the time on tax issues and consider so 
many issues I have thought about over the years that I need 
chortle) leaves me with the impression that usually the Ser-
(Footnote 12 continued in next column.) 
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A. Admission to a Partnership - Sections 707 
and 721 and the Common-Law Way 
Three avenues to becoming a partner by rendering 
(or promising to render) services are implicit in the 
authorities:13 
(1) From the 1954 code on, the first, and usual-
ly only, mode of judicial analysis of taxation of 
receipt of a profits share for services has been to 
apply section 721 governing contributions of 
property to a partnership in exchange for a 
partnership interest. The sticking point in this 
scenario has been that "services" do not con-
stitute "property" for purposes of the purported-
ly comparable section 35114 governing 
contributions of property to a "controlled" cor-
poration in exchange for a stock interest in the 
transferee corporation. 
vice in fact follows case law or legislative history (down or up 
to hearings and floor debate on occasion) in interpreting the 
code. Cf. "Service Ponders," note 11 supra ("The denial of de-
ductibility [in the Toxic Waste TAM] was not based on environ-
mental policy, and the current review of the treatment of en-
vironmental costs will not consider environmental policy, 
Carrington said. 'Environmental impact is an issue for legis-
lators and policy makers. My job is to only interpret the law,' 
he said."). For a noteworthy exception, see TAM 9128050 (April 
4, 1991). The notion of limitation of rulings to reflect only case 
law development conflicts with notion of evolutionary or com-
mon-law administrative interpretation. But in a world of "sub-
stantial authority" the maxim is in a very practical sense true 
- particularly with 1-in-3 standard for return preparers and 
taxpayer ability to rely on expert advice. In a world of actively 
leading and administratively shaping the law, here at least the 
maxim should be more honored in the breach. The good news 
is that section 707(a)(2) authorizes legislative regulations and 
with a clear aggregate mandate in defining a partner who 
contributes services for a partnership interest. The equally 
good news is that the Service has decades of ruling experience 
and hence fact patterns for ruling examples under the ap-
proaches suggested. I have every confidence that the drafters 
of such regulations can rise far above the headwaters of the 
incompletely thought out or at least laid out case law here. 
13Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in Campbell comeS as 
close as the courts have gotten since the 1939 code to ac-
knowledging the common-law nonrealization way of admis-
sion to a partnership, based on the 1984 legislative history of 
section 707(a)(2) or otherwise. On the other hand, some in 
the Service have clearly articulated the concept of common-
law nonrealization when services are contributed to the con-
duct of a venture at a profit. See notes 18-26 and accompany-
ing text. This whole notion is much clearer in the taxpayer's 
briefs in Campbell on appeal, which should be read prior to 
reading the opinion. Then the court's references to sections 707 
and 721 indicate it accepts the property/services section 707 
common-law admission to the partner relation dichotomy that 
Turlington (counsel for Campbell at planning, Tax Court, and 
appellate court stages), others, and I drew independently from 
the 1984 legislative history. The clearest and most extensive 
prior discussion of this is Hortenstine & Ford, supra note 3 at 
909. Cf. Cuff, supra note 5 at 653-54 (Campbell II "suggests, but 
does not hold, that section 707(a)(2) is the only way to tax the 
service 'profits' interest partner."). 
14Now section 351(d) so holds, but so did 1939 code case 
law. See authorities cited by Diamond, 56 T.C 530 at 545 n.14 
(1971) (Diamond I) . For criticism of the parity notion, see notes 
152-188 and accompanying text infra. 
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(2) Apart from a sale or exchange of property 
analysis, 1939 code cases fashioned a test based 
on an aggregate analysis for determining whether 
a partnership existed for tax purposes in the fami-
ly partnership area, where typically one family 
member provided services and another might 
provide capital (often originating as well with the 
service provider). Commissioner v. Culbertson, a 
landmark 1949 Supreme Court family partner-
ship decision, confirmed that the test for this pur-
pose was whether the parties - in good faith and 
for a business purpose - contributed services or 
capital to the present conduct of an enterprise.15 
The power of this federal common law concept 
of a partnership can be seen in its adoption else-
where, where partnership status is determinative 
for federal nonrevenue statutes.16 While the 
specific Culbertson context of family partnerships 
has been codified (but not preemptedl7) since 
15337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949). The standard was first fashioned 
in Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946), but Culbertson is 
more frequently cited. For detailed discussions of the deter-
minative Culbertson factor of objective to carryon business for 
joint profit (consonant with an aggregate analysis) see Bergford 
v. Commissioner, 93 TNT 264-10 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 1993); GCM 
36961 (Dec. 21, 1976); GCM 36436 (Sept. 25, 1975); TAM 
8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987); PLR 9249016 (Sept. 8, 1992). The 
similarity between this test and Justice Frankfurter's since-
discredited dictum "goods or services" definition of a trade or 
business (see Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987); 
Lee, "A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 
and Beyond," 29 Tax L. Rev. 347, 452-64 (1974) ("Lee, Section 
183") (criticizing "holding one's self out" doctrine along lines 
later reinvented by the Supreme Court because overlooked by 
all commentary at the time seeking to shape the Court's direc-
tion) has gone unnoticed in the cases, rulings, and the litera-
ture, according to my research and searches of the data bases. 
16Connors v. Ryan's Coal Co. 923 F.2d 1461, 1466-67 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act liability 
of joint venturer); accord, Central States Pension Fund v. 
Winstead, 991 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1993); Burke v. Friedman, 
556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (partner is not employee for 
purposes of unfair employment practices under Tower/Cul-
bertson goods or services for conduct of venture with com-
munity of interest in profits) . 
17 Arguably, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 330 (1937) 
(owner of capital by gift or otherwise is taxable on income it 
produces) was codified, not Culbertson (which held when a 
partnership must be recognized). Stanback v. Commissioner, 
271 F.2d 514, 518 (4th Cir. 1959). I think both are manifesta-
tions of a more general substance-of-the-transaction/ anti-
assignment-of-income principle or standard. PLR 8934014 
(May 23,1989); cf TAM 8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987) (citing Tower) . 
The starting point in researching "assignment of income" has 
to be Professor Eustice's many articles, as acknowledged by 
the Service in Action on Decision S.c. Johnson (October 7, 
1975) ("author of the leading articles in the assignment of 
income area," citing Eustice, "Contract Rights, Capital Gain, 
and Assignment of Income - The Ferrer Case," 20 Tax L. Rev. 
1 (1964»; accord, GCM 34152 (June 26, 1969) (same article); 
see also GCM 39252 (July 3, 1984) (citing Lyon & Eustice, 
"Assignments of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the 
P.G. Lake Case," 17 Tax L. Rev. 295 (1962); accord, GCM 3056 
(Sept. 26, 1972) (same article). I, too, started with Eustice in 
(Footnote 17 continued in next column.) 
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1951 by the predecessor to section 704(e), the Ser-
vice and the courts have frequently relied (under 
the 1954, and now the 1986, codes) on Culbertson's 
contribution of goods or services to the partner-
ship while participating in the community of 
profits and losses to determine whether "the com-
mon-law concept of the partnership relation"18 
my initial and later writings touching on assignment of in-
come. See Lee, "Section 482 and the Integrated Business 
Enterprise," 57 Va. L. Rev. 1376,1409-10 (1971); Lee & Bader, 
"Contingent Income Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisi-
tions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of In-
come," 12]. Corp. L. 137, 187-96 (1987). In any event, family 
partnership issues apart from section 704(e) still arise where 
capital is not a material income-producing factor. Conversely, 
section 704(e) determines partner status in a nonfamily con-
text where capital is a material income-producing factor. 
Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1971). 
18GCM 36113 (Dec. 19, 1974). (This article frequently cites 
General Counsel Memoranda, Technical Advice Memoranda, 
Actions on Decision, and Private Letter Rulings not as prece-
dents, but for their reasoning. To accentuate that perspective, 
the text often refers to the views of "some" in the Service, 
rather than the Service holds, etc.) The Joint Committee Staff 
paraphrased the Culbertson test without attribution. "In 
providing these new rules, Congress was mindful that to be 
considered partners for tax purposes, persons must, among 
other things, pool their assets and labor for the joint produc-
tion of profit." Joint Comm. Staff, General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 226 
(JCS-41-84 Dec. 31, 1984) ("1984 Bluebook"). Other ad-
ministrative rulings not citing Culbertson employ similar tests 
for partnership status. Rev. Rul. 75-43, 1975-1 C.B. 383, con-
sidered in GCM 35980 (Sept. 4, 1974) ("while X will receive 
a percentage of net profits and is obligated to make good 
losses on the cattle feeding operation that exceed 10 percent 
of A's commitment, such profit and loss sharing arises under 
the guarantee agreement and not because X has a proprietor's 
interest in the net profits or a proprietor's obligation to share 
losses." Joining in the community of the enterprise was the 
missing element barring partnership status.) For discussion 
of Culbertson's judicial progeny in this context, see Hor-
tenstine & Ford, supra note 3, at 887-88, 901-02, 905-06, 909-11 
(GCM 36346 (July 25, 1977), by reference to Rev. Rul. 75-43 
incorporated the Culbertson principle) . 
For reasoning and/ or factors decisive to determination of 
(a) such mutual responsibility, see GCM 38856 (May 19, 1982) 
(detailed facts of "exercise [of] mutual control over and as-
sume responsibilities of the enterprise"); TAM 8222079 (Feb. 
24, 1982) ("parties exercised mutual control over and as-
sumed mutual responsibility for the enterprise" which was 
to "construct, operate and maintain a multi-story office 
building"); TAM 8105030 (Oct. 29, 1980); TAM 8026023 
(March 31,1980); PLR 8052065 (Sept. 30, 1980); (b) "proprietary 
interest," see TAM 8026023 (March 31,1980); TAM 7847101 (no 
date given); TAM 7841001 (May [no day given] 1978); TAM 
7830006 (March 29, 1978); and (c) interest in profits, see GCM 
37077 (April 1, 1977) (purported general partners received 
fees as agents not partners). GCM 36961 (Dec. 21, 1976) noted 
that "the relevant factors have been described in a different 
manner [than by Culbertson]. E.g., (1) a contract, express or 
implied, that a joint venture be formed; (2) the contribution 
of money, property and/or services by the venturers; (3) an 
agreement for joint proprietorship and control; and (4) an 
. agreement to share profits. S.& M. Plumbing Co., Inc., 55 T.C. 
(Footnote 18 continued on next page.) 
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exists in the following contexts: (a) what is the 
proper tax entity to make elections~19 (b) ~hether 
the other purported venturer was mcurrmg spe-
cially treated (developmental) expenditures,2o 
(c) whether "principals" in an accounting firm 
were partners,21 (d) whether a partnership ex-
isted under the "not very helpful"22 code defini-
702, 707 (1971), acq., 1971-2 e.B. 3; Hyman Podell, 55 T.e. ~9, 
431 (1970)." {Footnote combined with text)). Freeze v. Umted 
States, 455 F.2d 1146, 1151 (10th Gr. 1972), insightfully speaks 
of the "joint venture quality" of the actual relationship of the 
alleged partners "contemplated by ... Culbertson ." I like the 
succinct PLR 8332076 (May 10, 1983): "From the many tax 
cases defining the relationship which gives rise to partner-
ship classification, one may distill the following objective 
indicators of requisite intent: (1) the parties must express an 
intent that a business venture be established; (2) the parties 
share in profits and losses of the venture as proprieto~s [~d 
proprietresses) and (3) the parties have made a contnbution 
of capital or services to the venture." See also GCM 35709 
(March 6, 1974). 
19Demirjian v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 5 (3rd Cir. 1972); 
PLR 8916034 (January 23, 1989) (section 1033 election). 
2°TAM 8802007 (Sept. 30, 1987); TAM 8302002 (Oct. 5, 1981) 
(no partnership for mine developmental expenditures); TAM 
8133021 (April 30, 1981) (intangible drilling costs); cf TAM 
7704080851A (April 8, 1977). 
21 Rev. Rul. 77-332, 1977-2 e.B. 483 (test whether "the per-
son has contributed money, goods, labor, or skill for the pur-
pose of carrying on a trade, profe.ssion, or. business, ~d par-
ticipates in the community of 10terest 10 the prohts and 
losses."), considered in GCM 36307 (June 13, 1975) (spells out 
significance of participating in such community); accord, TAM 
8001008 (Oct. 1, 1979); cf TAM 8753003 (Sept. 29, 1987) 
(secretarial services of one spouse for other CPA spouse did 
not amount to partnership); TAM 8742007 (June 26,1987) (per-
formance of secretarial and general agricultural services of 30 
hours a week plus allowing personally held land to be farmed 
by spouse did not amount to joint venture); TAM 8648006 
(Aug. 25, 1986) (contribution of services by one party and of 
orchard by the other together with mutual cont~ol of orch~d 
growing operations did not constitute partnership not shar10g 
of mutual proprietary interest in the net profits or of control 
over income and withdrawals). Case law sometimes does not 
reach the same results. Craig v. United States, 451 F. Supp. 378 
(N.D. S.D. 1978), Action on Decision CC-1979-46 (facts dose 
to TAM 8742007; held partnership). 
22GCM 37077 (April 1, 1977) (unusually detailed, helpful 
analysis of common law factors of Luna v. Commissioner, 42 
T.e. 1067 (1964), the major alternative precedent to Culbertson 
used by the Service in determining partnership status); see 
also GCM 36113 (Dec. 19, 1974) (because partnership is so 
broadly defined in section 7701(a)(2) that eisten~e of a 
partnership does not lend itself to statutory analYSIS). For 
additional detailed, helpful consideration of Luna factors, see 
GCM 36961 (Dec. 21 1976); GCM 36436 (Sept. 25, 1975) (ul-
timately turned on lack of mutual control; evaluation of sub-
stantial hazards of litigating position) . I am beginning to 
believe that such mutual control often goes to the essence of 
the aggregate notion of "like a proprietr~ss." For one t~g, 
active conduct of a rental real estate busmess by tenants-1O-
common constitutes a partnership. Treas. Reg. section 1.761-
l(a); Rev. RuJ. 75-374, 1975-2 e.B. 261 ("additional services . .. 
furnished by the co-owners or through their agent"); PLR 
8916034 (Jan. 23, 1989); PLR 8330093 (April 29, 1983). Manage-
(Footnote 22 continued in next column.) 
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tion,23 (e) whether sale of an interest in profits 
from sale of business assets was realized as an 
employee with a right to share in proceeds from 
the sale of her employer or as a partner,24 (f) 
whether a rental pool of condominium units 
pending sale in a "condominium conversion" 
constituted a partnership under section 761,25 and 
(g) when a member became a partner for (retroac-
tive or not) allocation of partnership income or 
10ss,26 Culbertson progeny could have envisioned 
ment or operational activities go to the heart of active con-
duct of a trade or business, a question on which my scholar-
ship has been recognized by those who matter. See GCM 
36387 (August 25, 1975) (citing Lee, "Functional Divisions and 
Other Corporate Separations Under Section 355 After Rilfferty," 
27 Tax L. Rev. 453 (1972»; GCM 36205 (March 21, 1975) (id.); 
GCM 36069 (November 5,1974) (id.); as has my scholarship on 
aggregate-entity Subchapter K niches such as the leve! .for 
determining profit motive, GCM 37190 (July 7, 1977) (clt1Og 
Lee, "Section 183," supra note 15); GCM 36577 (Feb. 26, 1976); 
and on profit motive requirement for trade or business status 
generally, Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154, 171 
at 174 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring and pointing to Lee, 
"Section 183," supra, on case-law origins of section 18~ regula-
tion factors) (taxpayer's central argument based on Id. as to 
"profit," see petition for certiorari) . 
23TAM 8222008 (Feb. 24, 1982) (arrangement to construct, 
operate, and maintain multistory office building co~stitut~d 
partnership under section 761 and Culbertson), conSIdered 10 
GCM 38856 (May 19, 1982); TAM 8105030 (Oct. 29, 1980); 
TAM 8001018 (Oct. 1, 1979) (starting point under sections 761 
and 7701(a)(2) is Culbertson standard: "whether all the facts 
regarding X and Y' s relations~p reveal that X was. estab-
lished for the purpose of carrY10g on a trade, professlOn, or 
business and that Y has contributed money, goods, labor, or 
skill to X to further such a purpose and participates in the 
community of interest in the profits and losses."); GCM 37193 
(July 13, 1977) ("a person must contribute either capital or 
services to be recognized as a partner"); GCM 36984 (Jan. 18, 
1977); GCM 36113 (Dec. 19, 1974) ("the common-law concept 
of the partnership relation allows the partners maximum 
flexibility in determining what each will contribute, how the 
operation will be run, and how the gains o~ loss~s .~ill be 
allocated. The code itself accommodates this fleXIbility by 
providing for the recognition of the partners'. shares of incom.e, 
gain, loss, deduction, or credit as expressed 10 the partn~rship 
agreement, unless the principal purpose of that allocation IS 
tax avoidance or evasion."); TAM 8003010 (Sept. 27, 1979) 
(professional corporation could be member of professional 
partnership); GCM 36961 (Dec. 21, 1976) (good di~cussion of 
mutual profit-sharing requirement in film production shelter 
context); see also PLR 8948020 (Sept. 1, 1989). 
24Freese v. United States, 455 F.2d 1146, 1151 (10th Gr. 1972). 
25TAM 8413003 (Nov. 30, 1983). 
26Rev. Rul. 77-119, 1977-1 e.B. 177 (Horst precludes retroac-
tive allocations to new partners); TAM 7606299220A (June 29, 
1976) (Culbertson precludes such retroactive allocations), con-
sidered in GCMs 36778 and 36835 (June 29 and Sept. 7, 1976, 
respectively) ("To interpret code section 761(c) as providing 
that persons who are partners at the time ~f a modifica~on 
are also to be viewed as partners for the entire year to whIch 
the modification relates would thus be a direct reversal of 
the result in Culbertson" since neither goods nor services had 
been supplied by the partner all through the year). The shift 
from Culbertson to Horst reflects Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 
F.2d 845, 857 (2d Gr. 1976). 
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such contributions of services or capital as being 
made pursuant to section 721 granting nonrecog-
nition to exchanges of property for a partnershiE 
interest; they never said one way or the other. 7 
But the toll of taxation triggered by that 
provision' s inapplicability to services28 would 
not have rung true when compared with the prac-
tical approach that the Culbertson progeny seem 
to have sought.29 The idea that Culbertson's "com-
mon law partnership relation" rests on a common 
law nonrealization upon performing or promis-
ing to perform partner capacity services in ex-
change for an entrepreneurial risk profits share 
only rings more true. In any event, Culbertson 
more recently has been so read, particularly in 
the context of the legislative history to the 1984 
amendments to section 707, which rests on an 
27 A computer search of cites for Culbertson or Tower or Luna 
within 25 words of section 721 yielded only one entry and it 
was to p . 721 of a cited authority. Actually, Culbertson itself 
was determined under the 1939 code, which contained neither 
a nonrecognition nor a nonrealization provision governing 
contributions to a partnership. There was only a judicial and 
administrative practice. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d 
Sess. 68 (1954) ("Contributions to a partnership will have the 
same effect under the proposed provisions as under present 
practice.") (Emphasis added); Hearings on Revenue Revision 
before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 83rd Cong., 
2d Sess. 1381 (1953) (describing ABA proposed nonrecognition 
upon contribution of property to a partnership in exchange 
for a partnership interest as "codifi ... [cation of] what is 
generally recognized as present law.") (Statement of Mark 
Johnson, for ABA). 
28Diamond I pointed out that section 721 simply didn't 
apply to a contribution of services because "a contribution 
of services is not a contribution of 'property. "' 56 T.C. at 545. 
The central thesis of this article is that a common law admis-
sion yields nonrealization apart from section 721 as to a con-
tribution of services, just as the better common law or ad-
ministrative "practice" yielded nonrealization as to 
contributions of either property or services under the 1939 
code and earlier revenue acts. Section 721 codified only the 
contribution-of-property part of that "practice." 
29The Supreme Court in United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 
449 (1973), a partnership tax authority in its own right, read 
Culbertson as illustrating "a foundational rule, which this 
Court described as ' the first principle of income taxation; that 
income must be taxed to him who earns it. "' Accord, PLR 
8934014 (May 23, 1989). Bayse may illustrate Professor Gunn's 
insight as to Subchapter K's bias toward nonrealization, 
Gunn, supra note 5 - what I would call an aggregate ap-
proach - in this case in the context of partner-partnership 
dealings unless departure is needed to avoid a more grievous 
departure from a fundamental tax principle. Subchapter K 
always has been along precisely this fault line. This analysis 
is close to that adopted in American Law Institute, Federal 
Income Tax Policy, Subchapter K, Proposals of the American 
Law Institute on Taxation of Partners 523-32 (ALI 1984) 
(adopted 1982) ("1982 ALI Proposals"). Bayse also can be read 
as limiting entity to information gathering and reporting, 
which might include assignment of income up to the 
partnership'S door. The aggregate approach as embodied in 
Culbertson polices assignment of income within the partner-
ship. See note 17 supra. 
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aggregate approach to entry of a services partner 
for a profits share.30 That is the evolving third 
avenue for nonrealization upon receipt of a 
profits share for services to the partnership. 
(3) The legislative history to the 1984 amend-
ments to section 707 governing transactions be-
tween a partner and her partnershiE not only 
rests on an aggregate methodology, 1 but con-
templates that a person performing partner-
capacity services for a partnership in exchange 
for a partnership allocation of partnership in-
come and subsequent distribution subject to 
entrepreneurial risks (presumably of profits 
rather than of distributions) will be treated as 
becoming a partner under Treasury regulations 
defining "partner" with rules to prevent abuses.32 
The Treasury staff further explains in the 1984 
Blue Book that 
[t]he regulations should provide rules fo r 
when persons who formally become partners 
after performing services for . . . the partnership 
are to be treated as partners at the time of the 
provision of services .... 33 
The drafters of the 1984 amendments to section 707 
intended that where the services were not rendered in 
301984 Bluebook, supra note 18, at 226. 
31See notes 222-234 infra and accompanying text. My un-
derstanding here is shared by the drafters of the American 
Bar Association, "Proposal to Amend the Regulations under 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Define a Partnership Capi-
tal Interest and a Partnership Profits Interest, and to Clarify 
the Tax Treatment of Compensatory Transfers of Both Forms 
of Partnership Interests" (April 17, 1987), electronically 
reproduced 87 TNT 91-24 (May 11, 1987) ("1987 ABA Section 
of Taxation Report"). I have heard this aggregate analysis 
derived from the 1984 legislative history described as the 
Hortenstine approach, presumably after Hortenstine & Ford, 
supra note 3 at 908-10 (appears to argue both sides quite well, 
though). I had the idea earlier when I came back to partner-
ship taxation in 1986 after a 10-year absence, but didn't 
publish it first and who knows when they first had the idea. 
If I were to pick an individual's name as the first to bring 
these notions out in print, it would be Charles Egerton from 
his work on the above report. This 1987 report contained the 
thought in embryonic form. I find the Tax Section's 1992 
report, also primarily prepared by Egerton, the best profes-
sional treatment of this analysis of the profit shares for ser-
vices problem. American Bar Association Section of Taxation, 
"Report on the Tax Consequences of the Receipt of a Partner-
ship Profits Interest for Services" Guly 31, 1992), electronically 
reproduced 92 TNT 223-40 (November 5, 1992) ("1992 ABA Tax 
Section Report"). 
32S. Rep . No. 169 (Vol I), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1984) 
("1984 Senate Report"); H.R. Rep . No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 861 (1984) ("1984 Conference Report") . The House 
amendments to section 707 would have applied only if a 
direct payment would have been a capital expenditure. The 
House bill also provided that partners joining at the end of 
a series of transactions would be treated as partners for the 
entire series. H.R. Rep. No. 432 (Part 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 
1221 (1984) ("1984 House Report"). The Senate Finance and 
Conference Committees believed existing Treasury 
regulatory authority could handle it. 
331984 Bluebook, supra note 18, at 233. 
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a partner capacity or the allocation-cum-distribution 
was not subject to entrepreneurial risk as to payment, 
the rendering of services and the payment for them 
would be treated as occurring between a third party 
and the partnership34 - i.e., the entity approach, which 
is entirely proper here since the partner is not behaving 
"like a proprietress," the policy standard for aggregate 
treatment.35 But what about the service provider who 
passes the "like a proprietress" standard on both the 
performance and payment ends? The drafters of sec-
tion 707(a)(2) in 1984 envisioned a Culbertson-like test 
under which the aggregate face of an invigorated sec-
tion 707 would effect nonrealization events as to the 
partner and the partnership, i.e., her other partners, 
with respect to her performance of the services and her 
receipt of the profits share.36 Such a receipt is not "pay-
ment."37 The proof can be found in the following pas-
sage from the 1984 committee reports: 
The committee does not intend that this 
provision [section 707(a)(2») will apply in every 
instance in which a partner acquires an interest 
in a partnership and also performs services or 
transfers property to the partnership. In par-
ticular, the committee does not intend to repeal 
the general rule under which gain or loss is not 
recognized on a contribution of property in 
return for a partnership interest (sec. 721) or to 
apply this new provision in cases in which a partner 
receives an allocation (or an increased allocation) for 
an extended period to reflect his contribution of 
property or services to the partnership provided the 
facts and circumstances indicate that the partner is 
receiving the allocation in his capacity as a partner 
[emphasis added).38 
34Id., at 226. Technically, the Bluebook is written by staff, 
but so are the committee reports. The difference is the chair-
man signs off on the latter and may be expected to know all 
the bottom line decisions described in the Report. See 128 
Congo Rec. (Part 12) 16918 (Senate July 19, 1982) (unstaged 
colloquy between Senators Bob Dole, R-Kan., and Bill 
Armstrong, R-Colo.). 1 would not expect the chairman to be 
responsible for knowing all of the additional bottom line, 
hopefully much more narrow, decisions embodied in the 
Bluebook. Pending regulations, however, taxpayers and the 
Service should be able to rely on decisions reflected in either 
equally. Once interpretive regulations are promulgated, the 
different weight that ought to be given to decisions reflected 
in the Committee Report and additional decisions reflected in 
any accompanying Bluebook appears to me about right in the 
existing distinction drawn by the Federal Circuit between 
binding authority and contemporaneous interpretation of ex-
perts. 
35See notes 79-84 infra and accompanying text. 
361 support and advocate this approach because, in addi-
tion to the legislative intent, it fully comports with an ag-
gregate approach to subchapter K's problems, other than 
those strictly relating to collecting and reporting income. 
That exception has been read pretty widely though. Ford V. 
Commissioner, 6 T.e. 499, 501 (1946), acq., 1946-2 e.B. 2. 
37 See note 72 infra. 
381984 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 226 (1984) (Em-
phasis added); 1984 House Report, supra note 32, at 1219. 
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Observe the following parallelism: (1) contribution 
of property and applicability of section 721, and (2) 
contribution of services and (a) inapplicability of sec-
tion 707(a)(2)(A) separate entity and hence "pay-
ment" treatment, but also implicitly (else why the 
duplicate predicates), (b) inapplicability of section 
721's nonrecognition shield, yet (c) implicit non-
recognition, since recognition would in effect mean 
applicability of section 707(a)(2). What does apply to 
contribution of services? The committee report 
answers this conundrum: Legislative regulations are 
to determine whether "the service performer or 
property transferor is actually a partner."39 The com-
mittee report goes on to list six factors to be "con-
sidered" in making such determination, which are 
discussed in section II.A.2 of this article. But the 
report also sketched the functional policy standard 
for determining partner status relating to the perfor-
mance of services: "nonabusive allocations that 
reflect the various economic conditions of the 
partners."40 And the passage italicized above itself 
echoes the following High Court CulbertsonlTower 
standard for determining whether a partnership ex-
ists: 
" ... when persons join together their money, 
goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying 
on a trade, profession, or business and when there 
is a community of interest in the profits and 
loses."41 
McKee, Nelson & Whitmire believe that an ap-
parent premise of new section 707(a)(2)(a) "is that 
the service provider is not taxed under sections 61 
and 83 upon receipt of an interest in partnership 
profits."42 This would seem to be the case as long as 
a "like a proprietress" standard is met with the 
rendering and payment for the services, and the 
above quoted committee report confirms such a 
premise. 
The path suggested by this reading of the 1984 legis-
lative history was less an innovation and more a 
codification (this time in the legislative history) of the 
Service's understanding of the current law or "prac-
tice." Seven years earlier, General Counsel Memoran-
dum 37193 (sanctioning a retroactive allocation to a 
service partner of 5 percent of an unexpected partner-
ship profit of $400,000, or $20,000, for discovery, 
promotion, and preliminary contact work he per-
formed prior to the partnership'S formation) provided 
a road map to the common law "admission to a 
391984 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 227. 
401984 Senate Report, supra note 32, at 226. Thus, "[aJn 
allocation and distribution provided for a service partner 
under the partnership agreement which subjects the partner 
to significant entrepreneurial risk as to both the amount and 
fact of payment generally should be recognized as a distribu-
tive share and a partnership distribution . ... " Id. at 227. 
41Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 740, quoting Tower, 327 U.S. at 286. 
421 McKee, Nelson & Wittrnire, Federal Taxation of Partner-
ships, para. 5.02[1J[bJ (2d ed. 1990). 
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partnership" notion through the subchapter K code 
sections.43 
4J"The proposed revenue ruling holds that the payment is a 
distribution of part of the partner's distributive share and that, 
as such, is includable in his taxable year within or with which 
ends the taxable year of the partnership in which the income 
was earned. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sections 702, 706(a), and 731 
[hereinafter cited as Code]. We agree with this conclusion . . .. 
The primary concern of the proposed revenue ruling is 
whether the payment of $20,000 to A is (1) a distributio~ of 
part of his distributive share taxable under Code section 
702(a), Code section 706(a), and Code section 731, (2) a 
'guaranteed payment' under Code section 707(c), or (3) com-
pensation for services rendered other than in a capacity as 
partner under Code section 707(a). Profits received by a 
partner are taxable in accordance with Code section 702(a), 
Code section 706(a), and Code section 731 unless Code sec-
tion 707(a) or Code section 707(c) applies. Edward T. Pratt, 64 
T.e. 203, 210 (1975), afr d in part and rev 'd in part, 550 E2d 1023 
(5th Cir. 1977). 
Treas. Reg. section 1.707-1(a) provides in part that trans-
fers of money or property by a partner to a partnership as 
contributions are not included within the provisions of Code 
section 707(a). In all cases, the substance of the transaction 
will govern rather than its form. This distinction betw~en 
contributions of money or property and transfers to which 
Code section 707(a) applies is also recognized for purposes 
of Code section 721, which deals with nonrecognition of gain 
or loss on contributions. See Treas. Reg. section 1.721-1(a). 
Although in applying this distinction, Treas. Reg. section 
1.707-1(a) and Treas. Reg. section 1.721-1(a) expressly refer 
only to transfers of money or property, we see no reason why 
the same rule should not apply to the performance of ser-
vices. When a partner performs services for a partnership 
and receives compensation therefor, Code section 707(a) 
should not apply if those services represent a contribution to 
the partnership and the compensation is merely a return 
upon that contribution. 
In the proposed revenue ruling, A performed discovery, 
promotion, and preliminary contact work prior to the forma-
tion of the partnership. However, he transferred to the 
partnership all the rights and benefits attributable to that 
work. The fact that he performed the services prior to forma-
tion of the partnership might conceivably raise a question 
whether his transfer to the partnership consisted of property 
rather than services. As discussed above, however, this ques-
tion should not be relevant in determining the application of 
Code section 707(a). What is relevant for purposes of that 
section is whether the transfer is in substance a contribution 
to the partnership. 
In determining whether a transfer of money or property 
to a partnership constitutes a contribution, as distinguished 
from a sale, exchange, loan, or rental transaction, the same 
criteria used in connection with corporate debt-equity ques-
tions are to be applied. See Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.e. 90 
(1964); GCM 36702, *** 1-415-74 (April 12, 1976), GCM 36031 
'**, 1-157-73 (Oct. I, 1974). The regulations state that if a 
transfer of property by a partner to a partnership results in 
the receipt by the partner of money other consideration,. in-
cluding a promissory obligation fixed in amount and tune 
for payment, the transaction will be treated as a sale or ex-
change under Code section 707 rather than a contribution 
under Code section 721. Treas. Reg. section 1.721-1(a). By 
analogy these criteria should also be applied in determining 
whether the performance of services for a partnership con-
stitutes a 'sale or exchange' of such services or a contribution. 
(Footnote 43 continued in next column.) 
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Implicitly receiving "an increase in his proprietary 
interest in partnership profits" was not thought to 
come under section 721. Accordingly, following the 
aggregate policy manifested in the 1984.legislative .his-
tory of section 707(a)(2), the future sectIon 707 legIs la-
tive regulations on the "reserved" topic of "Disguised 
payments for services" should eit~er (a) flesh o~t thi;: 
notion and Culbertson's "commumty of the busmess, 
with the help of ample existing rulings along those 
definitional lines in illustrating when receipt of a 
profits share for partner-capacity serv.ice,~ is n~t pay-
ment, or (2) treat past "partner-capacIty servIces or 
In the proposed revenue ruling, A receives no consider~­
tion for his services other than a share of the partnership 
profits. Although many factors must be considered in dete~­
mining whether a particular transaction constitutes a con tn-
bution, the fact that a transferor of property or renderer of 
services receives only a right to share in profits should 
generally be given more weight than the other factors con-
sidered. Cf. GCM 36412, ••• 1-324-73 Oan. 20, 1975); see also, 
GCM 36702, supra; Portage Plastics Co . v. United States, 301 
ESupp. 684 (W.D. Wisc. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 470 E 2d 
308 (7th Cir. 1972). 
Arguably, a person otherwise qualifying ~s a p~rtner 
could receive an additional share of partnership prohts for 
services performed as an agent of the partnership rather than 
as a partner. Cf. GCM 37077, ••• 1-49-77 (April I, 1977) and 
GCM 36961, "', 1-277-76 (Dec. 21, 1976). Presumably, such 
services would not be considered contributions to the 
partnership and Code section 707(a) would apply. However, 
it is the partnership agreement that defines the scope of the 
partnership, that is, the contributions of the partners an? 
their rights and obligations with respect to such cont~l­
butions. Cf., Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Clf. 
1977). Under the facts of the instant case, both the form and 
the substance of the partnership agreement, as amended, 
indicate that as consideration for his services, A was to 
receive an increase in his proprietary interest in partnership 
profits. Therefore, A should be vie.wed as ha~ing contri?uted 
these services, that is, as rendermg them fm a capaCIty as 
partner rather than as agent, so that Code section 707(a) does 
not apply. 
In short, a 'guaranteed payment' represents compe~ation 
in addition to a partner's distributive share for capItal or 
services contributed to a partnership. In this respect, a 
'guaranteed payment' differs from a Code section 707(a) ~ay­
ment which is a payment to a partner for property or serVIces 
that do not also entitle that partner to a distributive share, 
that is, a payment for property or services that were not 
contributed to the partnership. 
We recognize that the approach herein adopted for dis-
tinguishing between Code section 707(~) a~d (c) pay~e~ts 
will provide partners with so~e chOIce 10 determ~nll~g 
which section will apply. The eXIstence of such a chOIce IS 
merely an extension of the principle that partners are 
generally free to decide what each will contribute to .a 
partnership and what each will receive in exchange for hIS 
or her contribution. Of course, in determining whether a 
particular transaction is a contribution, substance must 
prevail over form. Treas . Reg. section 1.707-1(a) and Treas. 
Reg. section 1.721-1(a)." GCM 37193 Ouly 13, 1977); accord, 
TAM 8642003 Oune 30, 1986) (if section 707(a) and (c) are 
inapplicable to distributions, "the distributions must be 
treated pursuant to sections 702, 703, 704 and 731 of the 
Code."). 
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the promise to perform such services in the future as 
creating "property" subject to section 721 with tainted 
specially allocated built-in gain. An alternative smaller 
step, more appropriate to a ruling than legislative reg-
ulations, would be to rely instead on tax accounting 
rules. 
B. A Classic Open Transaction Solution: 
The Wrong Way 
At first blush, the Rev. Proc. 93-27 rule and excep-
tions appear to rest on the valuation/ open transaction 
approach.44 Clearly, neither a partnership with a highly 
predictable income stream nor a publicly traded 
partnership 45 pose much of a valuation problem. The 
sale-within-two-years exception could be viewed as a 
bright-line test46 for a too-immediate sale, which 
presumably, under Diamond, alleviates the valuation 
problem as wellY Many commentators have relied on 
the reed of the "open transaction" doctrine on the 
grounds that the value of a profits share was too 
speculative or was a "mere promise to pay."48 That 
doctrine should be sharply restricted to sales or ex-
changes under section 1001 due to the discrediting of 
44 For the perimeters of the debate, compare Cunningham, 
"Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services," 47 Tax 
L. Rev. 247 (1991), with Castleberry, Commentary: "Campbell 
- A Simpler Solution," id. at 277. See also Ordower, "Taxing 
Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity," 46 Tax Law. 19 
(1991). I have not thought much about the liquidation valua-
tion approach, which in fact Rev. Proc. 93-27 adopts per the 
recommendations of the 1991 Chicago Bar Report, supra note 
I, and thus have nothing to add to the debate. 
451991 LA Bar Report, supra note 5; The Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York, "Committee on the Taxation of 
Partnerships and Other Pass-Through Entities, Report on the 
Receipt of Partnership Interest for Services," section IV.A.4(b) 
(Feb. 28, 1991), electronically reproduced 91 TNT 62-30 ("1991 
New York City Bar Report"). 
46Similar two-year benchmarks are contained in sections 
452(e) and 334(b)(2) and, closer, in section 732(d). The new 
section 707 regulations also contain a two-year benchmark. 
See notes 124-126 infra and accompanying text. For a two-year 
benchmark analogy underlying the problem of ordinary in-
come/capital gains conversion, consider Treas. Reg. section 
1.469-2T(f)(5), which provides, in effect, that unless property 
developed by the taxpayer is rented for at least 24 months 
prior to selling the property (or contracting for its sale), the 
taxpayer's gain from the sale will not be treated as passive 
activity gross income. See Preamble, 53 Fed. Reg. 5693 (Feb. 
25,1990). The Chicago Bar Report had suggested a safe har-
bor of no sale or other disposition within one year after 
receipt. If a prohibited disposition occurred within one year 
after receipt of the profits share and the return for the year 
of receipt had already been filed, the report called for amend-
ing the year 1 return. 1991 Chicago Bar Report, supra note 1. 
471987 ABA Section of Taxation Report, supra note 31, at 
Suggested Amendments to Regulations, (b) Partnership 
Profits Interest (2). 
481987 ABA Section of Taxation Report, supra note 31; 1991 
LA Bar Report, supra note 5, at Analytical Construct; 1991 
New York City Bar Report, supra note 45, at II.C.l. For an 
excellent exposition of the classic open transaction doctrine, 
see Perry v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 183, 187-88 (8th Cir. 1945). 
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the cash equivalency doctrine.49 The open-transaction 
doctrine under section 1001- applicable to the receipt 
of property with no ascertainable fair market value -
and the "mere promise to pay" income for services 
doctrine under sections 61, 83, and 441 appear still 
viable,5o but conceptually questionable beyond stare 
decisis .51 After Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,52 the 
"cash equivalency" doctrine applied to sales of 
property should be dead, although some in the Service 
would erroneously53 limit Warren Jones to secured 
promises to pay.54 Overturning the cash equivalency 
doctrine as to dispositions of property even where the 
promise to pay is unsecured (as the legislative history 
pointed to in Warren Jones and the congressional tax 
policy articulated in the Installment Sales Revision Act 
of 1980 as to sales of property indicate we must),55 
49Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788, 792 (9th 
Cir. 1975). But cf Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 
1983) (no economic benefit from escrow because not the 
equivalent of cash); Falk, "Constructive Receipt and Economic 
Benefit: Putting Reed in the Proper Perspective," 62 Taxes 425, 
428-30 (1984)(properly criticizing extension of doctrine). 
soRev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174; accord, GCM 38917 (Nov. 
17,1982); PLR 9343012 (July 20, 1993). Cf. GCM 35709 (March 
6, 1974), p. 24. 
51 Goldsmith v. United States, 586 F.2d 810, 819 (Ct. Cl. 1978) 
("On fresh consideration, all such agreements might be con-
tended to be devices without business purpose created solely 
for their effect on taxes .... But taxation decisions, necessari-
ly retrospective in their operation, are not written on a clean 
slate. There are too many plans in effect, too many decisions 
and rulings ... on which taxpayers reasonably relied."). 
Some in the Service implicitly adopt the Goldsmith stance. 
GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979). 
52524 F.2d at 791-93; GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979); TAM 
83001001 (Sept. 4, 1979); PLR 7934023 (May 22, 1979). 
53Warren Jones accurately pointed out that the Revenue Act 
of 1921 contained a standard for "amount realized" (now 
section 1001) - "readily realizable fair market value" -
which roughly equates with the cash equivalency doctrine 
birthed two decades later, but the Revenue Act of 1924 
deliberately reversed course adopting the "fair market value" 
standard still in use. 524 F.2d at 791-2. My reading of Con-
fidential Hearings before the Senate Fin. Comm. on H.R. 
8243, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-8, 40-1 (1921) (Statements of Dr. 
Thomas (T.S.) Adams) ("1921 Confidential Senate Hearings") 
is that the 1921 act definition of "amount realized" was not 
intended to effect" a policy more favorable to the taxpayer" 
as the Ninth Circuit averred. Warren Jones Co., 524 F.2d at 791. 
54GCM 37371 (Dec. 22, 1977) pp 14-5; GCM 36771 (June 28, 
1976); see also TAM 8639006 (June 5, 1986). The Service 
properly abandoned any distinction on the basis of trans-
ferability. GCM 38034 (August 7, 1979) (answer to non-
marketability barrier to valuation is the "barter-equation" 
formula of Davis v. United States, 370 U.S. 65 (1962». 
55See note 53 supra, and S. Rep . No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 24 (1980) ("[Ilt is the Committee's intent that the cost-
recovery method not be available in the case of sales for a 
fixed price (whether the seller's obligation is evidenced by a 
note, contractual promise, or otherwise), and that its use be 
limited to those rare and extraordinary cases involving sales 
for a contingent price where the fair market value of the 
purchaser'S obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained."). 
Indefiniteness must be as to amount not as to the likelihood 
of payment at all. PLR 7903024 (Sept. 26, 1978). 
1741 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
leaves only the lack of an ascertainable fair market 
value as the traditional barrier to current taxation of 
receipt of a promise to pay in the future. And the Ser-
vice is notoriously hard-nosed in ascertaining a fair 
market value, even in contingent promises, except in 
rare and extraordinary circumstances.56 For instance, 
the Service has advocated valuing for purposes of sec-
tion 1001 land contracts,57 grain sale contracts,58 private 
annuities for a term certain59 (with the same controver-
sy over the relevance of security60), guaranteed future 
payments and royalties for the right to publish a future 
book;61 and a nonassignable nontransferable deferred 
sales contract for public stock.62 
I The Service is notoriously hard-nosed in ascertaining a fair market value, even in contingent promises, except in rare and extraordinary circumstances. 
Do the above rules regarding unsecured promises to 
pay for property apply to mere promises to pay for 
services? Some in the Service have believed that sales 
of services and of other property should be treated the 
same.63 But a majority considering the issue in avail-
able public documents draw a stark line between sales 
of property and sales of services, with mere promise to 
pay ruling almost supreme as to unfunded deferred 
compensation - even if such promise had an ascer-
56Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15; GCM 35709 (March 6, 
1974), considering Rev. Rul. 75-113 (advocates "middle of the 
road" standard); GCM 39252 (July 3,1984) (dictum since found 
promise to pay for services). GCM 34485 (April 22, 1971) 
provides an outstanding exposition of the Service's "middle 
ground" rule: "whether the right to the right to future income 
can 'be rationally made.'" It also points out the timing and 
character aspects of open transactions. By the way, I suspect, 
without having examined closely all of the public TAMs and 
PLRs on point, that this "standard" may be difficult to apply 
rationally. E.g., PLR 6104204770A (April 20, 1961). 
57TAM 8329027 (March 31, 1983); Warren Jones Co. involved 
a real estate land contract. 
58GCM 38034 (August 7, 1979); TAM 8001001 (Sept. 4, 
1979). 
59GCM 37371 (Dec. 22, 1977); PLR 7934023 (May 22,1979). 
60GCM 37371 (Dec. 22, 1977). 
61GCM 39252 (July 4, 1984) (held promised payment for 
services not goods so section 61 mere promise to pay bars 
taxation whereas sale of property for mere promise to pay 
would be taxed currently). 
62GCM 36771 (June 28, 1976). 
63GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979) (unable to construct argument 
dividing the areas "on the basis of 'goods' versus 'services"'). 
But see note 64. I have wondered whether that should be so 
ever since reading in the early 1970s Waller Horsley'S 
thoughtful and far ahead of its time "Tax Liability Without 
Cash: How 'Constructive Receipt' Traps Taxpayers," 31 J. Tax. 
116 (Aug. 1969), which I always recall as first making me 
think about the disparate treatment of future promises for 
goods versus services. I now suspect history and politics 
have more to do with the disparate treatment than policy or 
doctrinal imperatives. 
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tainable value.64 Some in the Service would extend the 
open transaction doctrine to accrual basis service 
providers so long as no note was given to evidence the 
recipient's obligation to pay for the services.65 But even 
as to deferred payment for services, some in the Service 
would tax the employee in the year of receipt of the 
mere promise to pay if he maintained too much 
"dominion and control."66 Although the legislative his-
tory to section 61 does not reveal quite the twists of 
section 1001 as to unfunded mere promises to pay, on 
the policy basis of horizontal equity and certainly ver-
tical equity67 as well, unfunded promises to pay for 
64(;CM 36771 (June 28, 1976); accord, GCM 39252 (July 3, 
1984) (no taxable event as to promise to pay a guaranteed 
amount for services as author, whereas identical mere promise 
to pay guaranteed amount for property, i.e., copyright, would 
be currently taxable.); TAM 8639006 (June 5, 1986). 
65See GCM 34853 (April 27, 1972), considering Rev. Rul. 
74-352. 
66GCM 36998 (Feb. 9, 1977); accord, GCM 37014 (Feb. 25, 
1977); GCM 37256 (Sept. 15, 1977) · (Under "dominion and 
control" theory, "there must be a right of the taxpayer to the 
income, the existence of an option or right to defer receipt of 
income that would otherwise be paid in the year earned, a 
voluntary decision to defer the receipt of such income, and 
the dominion and control over the withheld amounts, which 
may be evidenced by the authorization of the employer to 
invest such amounts for the benefit of the taxpayer with the 
risk of loss and benefit of appreciation therefrom remaining 
with such person, or by reposing in the taxpayer control over 
investments of such funds.") (relates theory to assignment of 
income doctrine); PLR 851102 (Dec . 7, 1984); TAM 
7509300060A (Sept. 30, 1975). Scanning the 14 or so GCMs 
using the term "dominion and control" indicated that 60 
percent or more involved estate and gift tax, about 25 percent 
deferred compensation. The thrust here appears to be owner-
ship rights other than right to receive (which would trigger 
the constructive receipt doctrine) and not economic benefit 
in the form of security beyond a mere promise to pay (which 
would trigger the economic benefit doctrine). Well-reasoned 
GCM 37812 (Jan. 5, 1979) also tied the theory into Helvering 
v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (retained strings made grantor 
taxable on income of family trust), which I find a better 
analogy than an assignment of income doctrirle bottomed on 
dominion and control over disposition rather than on the 
earning of the income. Again in a populist vein, I feel the 
first version of the assignment of income doctrine rests too 
much on ownership of capital rather than who earned the 
income. Cf. Lee & Bader, supra note 17, at 187-89. In practice 
15 to 20 years ago, the ploy to taxation in such impure "defer-
ral" cases was to tack on some forfeiture clause, usually in 
terms of future participation in deferrals. All of this appears 
suspect under the reasoning of GCM 36998, supra at pp. 31-32, 
and the more strict scrutiny of section 83(a) as to "substantial 
risk of forfeiture." 
67Horizontal equity would call for like tax treatment of all 
compensation, current and deferred, except for some over-
riding policy such as encouraging qualified retirement plans. 
Vertical equity would especially require this when the 
benefits of the special tax treatment are concentrated at the 
top. This is absolutely the case with "nonqualified" deferred 
compensation plans, which to avoid ERISA coverage, vest-
ing, and funding requirements can cover only "top hat" 
employees - ironically a signature characteristic of the 
(Footnote 67 continued on next page.) 
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goods and for services should be treated alike.68 The 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Revenue Act of 1978 
show that the distinction is far more political than con-
ceptual or policy-based.69 This should come as no 
surprise, since non qualified deferred compensation 
rules principally subsidize top management, a core 
constituency of the Republican party/o and the 
Republicans in Congress supplied the bulk of the votes 
of the "Conservative Coalition" in the House, which 
passed key elements of the Revenue Act of 197871 in 
uncommon exceptions to the closed rule. 
Much has been written about the application of sec-
tion 83 to the receipt of a profits share for services. The 
short answer is that if the aggregate tests are met as to 
the performance of the services and the partnership 
allocation and distribution, the receipt is not a "pay-
ment," but instead is a nontaxable event under CuI-
caricature "John Bull" image of British capitalism at the last 
turn of the century as well as of the early Bolshevik carica-
tures of capitalism. For a detailed discussion of the issues 
here (reaching conclusions consonant with the above 
criticisms), see Bishop & Durkin, "Nonqualified Deferred 
Compensation Plans: A Review and Critique," 17 Wm 
Mitchell L. Rev. 43 (1991). 
68Contrast GCM 38034 (Aug. 7, 1979) p . 19, with GCM 39252 
(July 3, 1984) p . 11. 
69The Revenue Act of 1978, the beginning of a lO-year era 
of the Conservative Coalition of Republicans and Southern 
Democrats prevailing on tax matters, deferred IRS rulings (in 
the form of proposed regulations) and reinstituted "case law" 
prior to Service-attempted reforms on a wide range of 
deferred and direct compensation matters including non-
qualified deferred compensation, state and local deferred 
compensation plans, cash-or-deferred qualified plans, 
cafeteria plans, and payments to independent contractors. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-66 (1978); S. 
Rep. No. 1263, id. at 63-79; H.R. 1800 (Conference Report), id. 
at 204-07. The Carter administration agreed with what the 
House had done. Hearings on H.R. 13511 (Revenue Act of 
1978) before the Senate Finance Comm. (Part 1), 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 135 (1978) (Statement of Treasury Secretary Blumen-
thal). In 1977, Congress deferred several attempts by the 
Service to restrict various forms of fringe benefits. See GCM 
37298 (Oct. 20, 1977) ("[T]he House Ways and Means Com-
mittee ... would suspend until April 30, 1978 the effective 
date of Rev. Rul. 76-453 [1976-2 e.B. 86, dealing with the 
deductibility of transportation costs between home and place 
of work] and - prescribe issuance of any regulations in the 
fringe benefit area prior to July 1, 1978."). Earlier, the House, 
in 1969, unsuccessfully attempted to tax a portion of non-
qualified deferred compensation because such deferral 
"should not be available to employees who are in a position 
to bargain for deferred compensation arrangements .. . [from 
a large, financially sound corporation], when such benefits 
are not available to other employees." H .R. Rep. No. 413 (Part 
1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1969). 
70See Lee, "'Death and Taxes' and Hypocrisy," 60 Tax Notes 
1393, 1397 (Sept. 6, 1993) ("Lee, Death and Taxes"). 
nSee Lee, "President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals," 
59 Tax Notes 1399, 1416-17 (June 7, 1993) ("Lee, Clinton's 
Capital Gains Proposals"). 
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bertson, so that section 83 is never triggered.72 This 
analysis supports the exclusion of "mere promises to 
pay" from the reach of section 83 by regulations section 
1.83-3(e) as not constituting " p rop erty. "73 
The Republicans in Congress supplied 
the bulk of the votes of the 
'Conservative Coalition' in the House, 
which passed key elements of the 
Revenue Act of 1978 in uncommon 
exceptions to the closed rule. 
Therefore, the "mere promise to pay" doctrine 
should not be extended to receipt of a partnership 
profits share for partner-capacity services. Nor does 
the classic (indeterminable amount) open-transaction 
doctrine under Burnet v. Logan74 fare much better. That 
case turned on the possibility that the taxpayer might 
otherwise be taxed prior to recovering her basis.75 In a 
profits share received for partner-capacity services, the 
service renderer typicall~ has no basis in the intangible 
created by the services. 6 More significantly, the fact 
that limited partners in many instances (prior to the 
passive activity loss rules) paid for a share of losses 
(and profits) helps establish value. 
C. An Aggregate Approach: The Right Way 
1. Aggregate concept: 'hypothetical proprietress' 
standard. This article maintains that, as contrasted 
with a valuation approach, an aggregate approach bet-
ter supports Rev. Proc. 93-27's general nontaxable 
event rule and all its exceptions, with certain modifica-
72PLR 8727828 (April 3, 1987). Receipt of an interest in a 
"pool of capital" is not payment or compensation for services 
but instead tax-free receipt for services rendered. TAM 
8137006 (July 23, 1980); TAM 8129006 (March 30,1981); see also 
Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 e.B. 78. Therefore, section 83 does not 
apply. TAM 8047005 (July 24,1980); TAM 8129006 (March 30, 
1981). I believe this is the answer to the question of some in 
the Service as to "Where do you get the entrepreneurial risk 
theory out of the statute [section 83]?" Sheppard, "Partnership 
Interests Exchanged for Services: Implementing Campbell," 48 
Tax Notes 1212, 1213 (Sept. 3, 1990): Out of the term "pay-
ment." As to the "pool of capital" analogy, recent case law has 
focused too much on services/compensation much like 
Diamond, with no apparent awareness of an aggregate model. 
See, e.g ., Zuhone v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Cline v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1980); Cline v. 
Commissioner, 67 T.e. 889, 895 (1977) (Tannenwald, J., dissent-
ing). 
73GCM 39230 (May 7, 1984). 
74283 U.S. 404,411 (1931); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 e.B. 15; 
see Lee & Bader, supra note 17, at 174. 
75283 U.S. at 412-13. 
76Castleberry, supra note 44 (classic extension of open 
transaction doctrine to character of income when transaction 
closes, Carter v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948), 
involved zero basis). In year 1, shareholder in liquidating 
corporation received payments in excess of basis in stock and 
at issue was the character of additional "contingent" pay-
ments received in year 2. 
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tions for sales within two years. The appellate 
Campbell's "enigmatic"77 nontaxability under section 
707 of receipt of a profits share for services dictum 
alludes to an aggregate analysis of the profits share for 
services issue. Indeed, the appellate court's perception 
of the realization issue when a taxpayer performs 
partner-capacity services in return for a profits share 
subject to the risks of the venture is based on a reading 
of the 1984 legislative history similar to that taken 
above. 78 
An aggregate approach to a particular subchapter K 
provision seeks to tax a partner in the same manner as 
a hypothetical individual entrepreneur or proprietor in 
similar circumstances would be taxed.79 An aggregate 
approach is consistent with the long-held Treasury80 
(and IRS81 as well) conceptualization of Eartnership 
taxation. Some, but not all, commentators 2 also have 
come to favor an aggregate approach in interpreting 
provisions of, and backfilling gaps in, subchapter K. 
Under this analysis, just as a proprietor improving his 
business property is not taxed until the property 
" Cuff, supra note 5; Comment, "The Receipt of Profits Inter-
est in a Partnership as a Taxable Event after Campbell and Mark 
IY," 57 Mo. L. Rev. 273,294 (1992). Cf Sheppard, "News Analysis: 
Eighth Circuit Further Confuses Diamond Issue in Campbell, 52 
Tax Notes 1353,1355 (Sept. 16, 1991) ("obtuse wording"). 
78See Appendix to second installment of this article in Tax 
Notes, April 4, 1994. 
79Lane, supra note 8, at 246, 247, 249, 254; 1982 ALI Partner-
ship Proposals, supra note 29, at 151-53. Lee, "Entity Clas-
sification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Per-
sonal Service Corporations and the Tax Legislative Process," 
8 Va . Tax Rev. 1,88-9 and n.126 (1988) ("Lee, Entity Classifica-
tion") and authorities cited therein; 1991 New York City Re-
port, supra note 45 at III. Policy Considerations. 
80See note 156 infra for Treasury position in 1930s. For 
modern affirmation under subchapter K, see Department of 
the Treasury, the president's 1978 Tax Program: Detailed 
Descriptions and Supporting Analyses of the Proposals 118 
(1978), reprinted in Message from the President of the United 
States Transmitting Proposals for Tax Reductions and 
Reform, H.D. 283, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 277 (1978); Cunning-
ham, supra note 44, and Castleberry, supra note 44. 
81 See Appendix. 
82Cunningham, supra note 44; Schmolka, supra note 3; Lane, 
supra note 8; 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra note 45; 
1982 ALI Proposals, supra note 29 at 523-32 (in the absence of 
countervailing factors use aggregate approach); Lee, "Entity 
Classification," supra note 79. The various bar reports, happily 
electronically reproduced by Tax Notes Today, generally follow 
an aggregate approach as well. Contra, Cowan, supra note 8; 
Keyser, "A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax: 
The Case of Partnership Formation," 5 Amer. J. Tax Policy 269 
(1986) ("economic" analysis of risk shifting); Postlewaite, Dut-
ton & Magette, "A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax 
Project - Subchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of 
Partners," 75 Ceo. L. J. 423,465,487 (1986) (would apply entity 
approach largely because of technical changes in a partner's 
control assets contributed to the partnership - the underlying 
rationale of Helvering V. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1938), Friedman, supra note 5 (entity ap-
proach to achieve parity with corporate securities). Cf McKee, 
"Partnership Allocations: The Need for an Entity Approach," 
66 Va . L. Rev. 1039 (1980). 
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produces income or is disposed of in a taxable trans-
action,83 receipt of a profits interest for services is non-
taxable so long as such services are rendered in a 
partner-like capacity and the partnership'S payment of 
the profit share is in effect subject to entrepreneurial 
risks.84 As discussed above, the legislative history of 
the 1984 amendments to section 707 employs just such 
an analysis in distinguishing taxable sales of services 
or property between a partner and his partnership from 
tax-free contributions of such services or property with 
partnership payment in the form of any partnership 
distributions.85 
83Lane, supra note 8; 1982 ALI Proposals, supra note 29; and 
Cunningham, supra note 44, all use variants of this example. 
It really does strike the mind's eye. I was convinced by Lane, 
but only after the 1984 legislative history shook loose my 
preconceptions (partially attributable to conversations with 
Bill McKee in the early 1970s). You don't have to be a weather 
reporter to hear the aggregate-entity "winds of change" blow 
- Canellos, "Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By 
Default," 35 Tax Notes 999, 1006 Oune 8, 1987) - once you 
study the 1984 legislative history to section 707(a)(2). 
MCampbellll, 943 F.2d at 822-23. The Eighth Circuit agreed 
with commentators that section 721, providing for nonrecog-
nition as to an exchange of property for an · interest in a 
partnership, does not apply to a service partner because he 
"does not contribute property in exchange for his partnership 
interest." 943 F.2d at 821. A section 707 analysis supported in 
the court's eyes the taxpayer's arguments that "a service 
partner . .. who receives a profits interest ... in a partnership 
does not realize income upon receipt of that interest, and, 
therefore, no taxable event occurs." 943 F.2d at 822 and 818. 
"Campbell's interests were not transferable and were not 
likely to provide immediate returns. Thus, we doubt that the 
tax court correctly held that Campbell's profits interests were 
taxable upon receipt." 943 F.2d at 822. Note that the Eighth 
Circuit did not exactly track the second leg of the partner-
capacity services/entrepreneurial-risk as to payment model 
described in text, and advocated by Turlington on brief on 
the basis of the 1984 legislative history of section 707(a)(2). 
Reading that legislative history in the light of the legislative 
history of section 469 led to a sea change in my VIew of the 
aggregate/ entity conflict in subchapter K. The Eighth Circuit 
referred instead, intentionally I suspect, to facts manifesting 
entrepreneurial risk - "Campbell's interests were not trans-
ferable and were not likely to provide immediate returns." 
943 F.2d at 822-23. Of course, at the same time so formulated, 
these conclusions are relevant to a valuation analysis as well. 
See Weidner, "Pratt and Deductions for Payments to 
Partners," 12 Real Prop. and Tr. J. 811,812 (1977), cited by GCM 
38067 (Aug. 29, 1979) as among the best of the numerous Pratt 
articles. 
85 As others have noticed, I ultimately base my aggregate-
leaning on a populist view of partnerships as composed of 
small business people. So did the Ways and Means Chairman 
Bob Doughton, D-N.C., and other populist hill country 
Democrats of the 1930s. In the 1936 House hearings on the 
proposed tax on undistributed corporate profits, they fre-
quently grilled witnesses, including a Treasury repre-
sentative, on why a small corporation should pay less tax on 
its retained earnings than a small partnership on earnings 
plowed back into the firm. Hearings on Revenue Act, 1936, 
before the House Ways and Means Committee, 74th Cong., 
(Footnote 85 continued on next page.) 
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2d Sess. 75 (Rep. Jere Cooper, D-Tenn.); 133 (Rep. Samuel Hill, 
D-Wash.); 139 (Chairman Bob Doughton, D-N.C.); 239 (Hill); 
341 (Hill); 343-45 (Doughton); 470-71 (Dough ton); and 643 
(Colloquy between Chairman Doughton and a Treasury rep-
resentative) (1936) ("1936 House Hearings"); see also Hear-
ings on President's 1963 Tax Message before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means (Part I), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 
600-01 (1963) (Colloquy between Rep. Howard Baker, R-
Tenn., and Secretary of the Treasury Dillon). The answer 
always was the small business could incorporate (and thus 
obtain part of the current subsidy of $2 or $3 billion a year 
attributable to the inside graduated corporate rates), which 
partially explains the over 1,000-percent growth in small cor-
porations from the 1930s to the mid-1980s, while the popula-
tion increased only 150 percent or so. The problem was 
present from the beginning. 1921 Confidential Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 53, at 12, 14-5 (Colloquy between Dr. Adams 
and Sen. Farnifold Simmons, D-N.C.) (complexities of which 
entity has tax advantage; Adams testified that equality would 
require that all small (10 owners or less) business entities be 
taxed the same. Amen.). The words of these men on the 
inequities of a lower inside corporate tax rate on (today's 
small annual amounts) of retained income as contrasted with 
higher "outside" rates applicable to an individual or partner-
ship plowing profits back into the venture still stir me: 
"THE CHAIRMAN. Of course, every man in business, 
every corporation, or every individual engaged in business, 
think they would grow rapidly, and probably could, if they 
had no expenses; but the support of the Government is neces-
sary and a proper expense of business, on those who make 
money. Now, they should be placed on the same level, should 
they not? The corporation, those engaging in business in a 
corporate form, have an advantage, over the individual, the 
partnership; a decided advantage. They have an advantage 
in many ways, but the special advantage which they have is 
that they have a larger amount of capital with which to do 
business, and the larger the capital is, the stronger the or-
ganization they can perfect, and the more they can have of 
mass production; and they can organize a more extensive 
sales agency. They have an advantage in both production and 
in distribution that the man of small means does not have . ... 
Why should we still give them another advantage in the matter 
of taxes? In that way, the big man can always keep the little 
fellow down and prevent his ever getting on his feet. ... You 
want to cripple him, start him out with a disadvantage, start 
him out with the other fellow miles ahead of him, and then 
expect him to keep up in the race." 
1936 House Hearings at 343-44. The story gets better as 
Chairman Doughton forces the witness to explicate his simile 
of not having the tax "tail wag the dog." The corporation was 
the dog and the little fellow was the tail. ld. at 345. The 
witness explained that he really meant minorities (the tail) 
as against majorities. In view of the fact that partnerships 
and sole proprietors numbered in the millions while corpora-
tions were less than 500,000 at this time, this is even more 
revealing and deserving of populist scorn. My testimony to 
a House Ways and Means Subcommittee in 1987 was moti-
vated by almost the same outrage. Hearings on Master 
Limited Partnerships before the House Ways and Means Sub-
comm. on Select Revenue Measures, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 
351 (1987). In actuality, today the bias by and large is not in 
favor of incorporated business versus unincorporated busi-
ness (most of the latter are so small that they are taxed at 
individual income tax rates comparable to the IS-percent 
inside small income corporate rate), but in favor of (incor-
porated) business over moderate income workers. Or so I 
assert to my students for discussion purposes. Cf. Lee, supra 
note 79, at 69 n .34 (double taxation is a "Briarpatch" argu-
(Footnote 85 continued in next column.) 
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2. Aggregate theory and receipt of profit share for 
partner-capacity services. Payment of a profit share 
in a partnership with a "substantially certain and pre-
dictable stream of income" under the Revenue Proce-
dure 93-27 exception clearly would not be subject to 
entrepreneurial risk.86 Arguably, the same would be 
true of an interest in a publicly traded partnership 
(PTP)87 - just as a shareholder in a (publicly traded) 
corporation,88 a PTP partner is subject to investment, 
not entrepreneurial risk.89 More fundamentally, recog-
nition upon receipt of such a profits share should result 
because a PTP partner does not materially participate 
in operations or management in his partner capacity, 
ment for most close corporations. The small C corporation 
regime with lower inside tax on annual accumulations of up 
to $100,000, no dividends, and a capital gains tax or step-up 
in basis at death and no tax outside on such accumulations, 
offset only somewhat by repeal of the codified General 
Utilities concept, produces less taxes than direct taxation of 
the owner as a proprietor). I believe that is the U.S. definition 
of capitalism - workers are taxed heavier than capitalists. 
True in the 1920s and true in the 1980s. The Clinton tax plan 
brought the capitalists (more the high-income professional 
two-income workers) more back in line with the other 
workers - taking into account payroll and other regressive 
taxes. See Lee, "Clinton's Capital Gains Provisions," supra 
note 71, at 1410; Lee, "Death and Taxes," supra note 70, at 
1396,1398. 
Conversely, I wonder whether Judge Learned Hand's en-
tity-tinged tax view of partnerships reflects a North-
easterner's experiences with large investment partnerships 
that seem more like entities (certainly to populist eyes). More 
likely, such views represent an "entangle ... [ment] in the 
jurisprudential aspects of so-called legal 'entities' to such an 
extent as to cause it [the tribunal] to overlook the real mean-
ing and purposes of these enactments." Commissioner v. Whit-
ney, 169 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948). 
861991 LA Bar Report, supra note 5 (tax service provider 
on receipt of profits share where capital is a material income 
producing factor and she has no material entrepreneurial 
risk); 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra note 45 (readily 
tradeable profits share should be currently taxed) . The 1982 
ALI Report, supra note 28 at 163-65, noted that under a 
private letter ruling reported in the Wall Street Journal a 
guaranteed payment to a manager of tax-exempt bond funds 
had passed through tax-exempt interest. See also 1991 New 
York City Bar Report, supra note 45 (section 707(a)(2) now 
addresses); addressed also in Rev. Rul. 81-301, 1981-2 C.B. 
144, considered in GCM 38067 (Aug. 29, 1979). 
871991 LA Bar Report, supra note 5; 1991 New York City 
Bar Report, supra note 45. 
88 A shareholder is not engaged in the trade or business of 
her corporation (even if closely held) under Whipple v. Com-
missioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963), while a partner in contrast is 
engaged in the business of her partnership, Stanchfield v. 
Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. 1681 (1965); accord, Butler v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C. 1097 (1961), acq. 1962-1 C.B. 3; GCM 39406 
(Sept. 6, 1985); TAM 9310001 (November 4,1992). On a policy 
basis, the latter rule should be limited to general partners, 
but the precedents go the other way. See GCM 39406, supra; 
GCM 36577 (Feb. 26, 1976), p. 38 (citing Lee," Section 183," 
supra note 15). 
89Professor Rudnick points out that entrepreneurial risk 
differs from economic risk. Rudnick, "Who Should Pay the 
Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?," 39 Case Western L. Rev. 
965, 1158 n. 680 (1989) . 
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